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11 Introduction
There is a considerable heterogeneity across OECD countries in the variance of annual GDP
growth rates. This variance ranges from 25% and 15% for Greece and Japan in the 1961 to
1983 period down to 1.7% and 1.3% for France and Italy for 1984 to 2003. Empirical studies
show further that countries have breaks in their variance of growth rates over time (e.g. Kim
and Nelson, 1999; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Stock and Watson, 2003). Do these
diﬀerences in volatility have only external causes such as terms of trade shocks, monetary or
exogenous productivity shocks? Or is growth volatility of a country an endogenous, natural
phenomenon of any growing economy and thereby also a function of various fundamentals
of the economy under consideration, including economic policy? Stock and Watson (2003),
surveying the literature on the ”big moderation”, attribute (roughly and with caveats) one
quarter of the moderation in volatility in the US to improved policy, one quarter to good
luck (lower volatility of productivity and commodity price shocks) and 50% to "unknown
forms of good luck".
This paper provides a theory of volatility that helps understanding some possible deeper
reasons behind these various sources of volatility. It is part of a small but rapidly growing
literature that integrates endogenous short-run ﬂuctuations with endogenous long-run growth
(e.g. Bental and Peled, 1996; Matsuyama, 1999; Wälde, 1999, 2002, 2005; Francois and
Lloyd-Ellis, 2003; Maliar and Maliar, 2004, Phillips and Wrase, 20052). It argues that
volatility of a country can be viewed to be something natural, inherently linked to its growth
process. As a consequence, volatility is just as endogenous as is the GDP growth rate.
Sustained per-capita growth is obtained by R&D causing jumps of technological frontiers
(as in Aghion and Howitt, 1992 or Aghion, 2002). The resulting step function of labour
productivity implies that growth and volatility can be traced back to the same source.3
In this setup, volatility and long-run growth result primarily (but not exclusively) from the
introduction of new technologies. "Lower volatility of productivity" or "other unknown forms
of good luck" can therefore be traced back to changes in fundamentals of the economy. As
both long-run growth and short-run volatility are endogenous and therefore react to changes
in policy, we can analyze to what extent policy changes aﬀect volatility and growth at the
same time or independently of each other. Understanding breaks over time for e.g. the US
seems to require a break in volatility without a break in the growth trend (McConnell and
Perez-Quiros, 2000). In a model without an explicit analysis of growth, such a simultaneous
analysis would not be possible.
We analyze two measures of volatility: the variance of the growth rate of the economy,
a widely used measure in empirical regression work (e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995), and
2These papers share the view that intentional investment into R&D can not only explain long-run growth
but also short-run ﬂuctuations - without invoking exogenous disturbances to the economy. At the risk
of simplifying too much, short-run ﬂuctuations and long-run growth result from the introduction of more
productive technologies as new technologies increase TFP by a discrete amount, similar to a step function,
and not smoothly and continuously as in standard models. Due to the explicit modelling of R&D processes,
these models can be viewed to represent industrialized economies. Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999)
analyse an AK-type economy with borrowing constraints and investors and savers that are distinct agents.
They ﬁnd that when ”the separation <b e t w e e ni n v e s t o r sa n ds a v e r s > is large but not too large <...> we
observe short-run instability” (p. 1375). If the separation is too large, there would be a permanent slump.
Without separation, the economy converges to balanced growth. Hence, their intermediate case with growth
and ﬂuctuations seems to best describe developing countries.
3Stochastic models of this theoretical literature therefore share Beveridge and Nelson‘s (1981) econometric
view that trend and cycle are driven by the same shock, i.e. (here) jumps in the technological frontier.
2the coeﬃcient of variation for cyclical components of time series, similar to those used in
the RBC literature. It turns out that the variance of the growth rate does not - due to its
complexity - lend itself to an intuitive theoretical analysis. Cyclical components have very
simple moments, however, that reveal insightful relationships between model parameters
and volatility. All measures are obtained analytically due to assuming a simple parameter
restriction.
A question that arises immediately in a ﬂuctuating economy asks whether higher or lower
volatility should give rise to policy concerns. One possible answer to this question is a clear
’No’. The RBC approach is built (at least initially) on the belief that agents adjust optimally
to a ﬂuctuating world where markets are perfect and factor allocation is eﬃcient (Kydland
and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983)4. Lucas (1987, 2003) and others (surveyed
in Lucas, 2003) show that, even in such a perfect world, welfare gains from removing all
volatility do exist in principle (due to risk-aversion of households) but are quantitatively
small. They amount to ”about one-twentieth of 1 percent of consumption”.5
The present paper argues that the belief that volatility per se is not an argument for
welfare concerns in the Lucas sense is true indeed - as long as one beliefs that the engines of
growth in an economy work under the absence of any imperfections as well. This assump-
tion is implicit in standard RBC models where the growth process - in the Solow tradition
- is viewed as exogenous. It is then easy to imagine indeed that in a perfectly competitive
economy adjustment to exogenous disturbances takes place in an eﬃcient way. This paper
starts from the belief that (empirically speaking: at least to some extent) ﬂuctuations in
an economy are the result of the same type of technological progress that causes long-run
growth. As the source of long-run growth and therefore short-run ﬂuctuations is explicitly
modelled, this endogeneity introduces various types of imperfections. Hence, if one believes
that sources of growth are endogenous and taking the lessons from the ”new” growth the-
ory seriously (where it might be diﬃcult in R&D based models to justify that endogenous
technological progress comes along without any externalities), ﬂuctuations go hand in hand
with imperfections. This is true even in our setup where all ﬁrms operate under perfect
competition, including R&D ﬁrms.6
We will see that an economy with exogenous growth and ﬂuctuations is a special case of
our more general model. In this special case, which could be argued to reﬂect the standard
RBC approach, ﬂuctuations and eﬃciency are no contradiction. In the general case with en-
dogenous long-run growth and endogenous short-run ﬂuctuations, ﬂuctuations and eﬃciency
contradict each other. Here as well, a simple parameter restriction allows us to derive a very
intuitive closed form expression for the value function - the standard measure of welfare.
We relate our analysis of endogenous volatility and welfare to taxation for two reasons:
First, there is a considerable heterogeneity in tax systems across countries and over time
(e.g. Mendoza, Tesar and Razin, 1994; Padovano and Galli, 2001). For the US, two major
tax reforms, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (see
e.g. Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997), took place around the point in time where the break in
4More recent work, analysing international linkages under imperfections or monetary business cycles
under price staggering, include Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) or Kehoe and Perri (2002).
5Epaulart and Pommeret (2003), Krebs (2003) or Barlevy (2004) ﬁnd that welfare gains from less volatility
can be substantially larger and increase up to several percentage points. Lucas (2003) argues that welfare
gains remain small under realistic parameter assumptions.
6There are by now various papers that stress that R&D and perfect competition does not contradict each
other. The ﬁrst paper seems to be Funk (1996). Later work includes Boldrin and Levine (2004), Hellwig
and Irmen (2001) and Wälde (2002).
3GDP volatility is usually identiﬁed (between the 4th quarter of 1982 and 3rd quarter of 1985,
according to Stock and Watson, 2003). It is therefore natural to ask whether tax reforms
or cross-country diﬀerences in tax systems are candidates for understanding diﬀerences in
volatility. It is generally accepted that taxes can aﬀe c tt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fac o u n t r yo r
its natural rate of unemployment - they could therefore also aﬀect its natural amount of
volatility. Second, the ineﬃciency introduced by the endogeneity of R&D and volatility can
in principle be eliminated by appropriate taxes and subsidies. We do not require that the
government has a lot of information about the current state of the economy and assume that
it sets constant, i.e. time- and state-invariant, taxes on labour and capital income, wealth,
consumption, investment and R&D.
Talking more precisely about our results, one contribution is the derivation of analytical
measures of volatility in a model characterized by ”standard” properties: inﬁnite planning
horizon of the representative agent, standard intertemporal optimization decisions concern-
ing savings and investment under risk aversion, uncertainty from properties of technologi-
cal progress and perfect competition for all production processes. Analytical measures for
volatility (and also welfare) can be obtained by assuming a simple parameter restriction.
Analyzing the behaviour of an economy for restrictions of this type has turned out to be
very useful (e.g. Long and Plosser, 1983; Xie, 1991; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1994; Wälde,
2005). This restriction allows us to represent equilibrium properties of our economy by a
simple linear stochastic diﬀerential equation for instantaneous utility. Using the methods
presented by Garcia and Griego (1994), we can then analytically compute moments of time
series as predicted by our model. We then use the coeﬃcient of variation as our measure of
volatility.
This parameter restriction also allows us to compute an explicit expression for welfare.
In doing so, we obtain a deterministic diﬀerential equation that describes how the economy
evolves in an expected sense, i.e. how expected instantaneous utility evolves for τ>t ,where
t is today. This diﬀerential equation nicely shows that our economy behaves in this expected
sense exactly as a deterministic Solow growth economy behaves with a ﬁxed saving rate.
Intuitively speaking, our stochastic economy turns out to be a Solow growth economy where
labour productivity increases at (endogenous and optimally chosen) random points in time
by discrete amounts.
Concerning the eﬀects of taxation on volatility, we ﬁnd that volatility is aﬀected through
three channels: The speed of convergence, the expected length of a cycle and the degree
how strongly cyclical components are thrown back once a new technology arrives. All of
these three channels can be easily related to properties of transitional paths towards some
steady state. As taxes aﬀect transitional paths of various economic variables, taxation aﬀects
volatility. For the equilibrium we analyze, taxes on labour and capital income and invest-
ment goods increase volatility, taxes on R&D and wealth have a stabilizing eﬀect, a tax on
consumption goods is neutral. A stabilization policy does not require knowledge about the
current state of the economy. Taxes are constant and thereby time- and state-invariant.
Nevertheless, higher or lower tax levels can stabilize or destabilize the economy.
Our welfare analysis shows that taxes on investment goods and R&D directly aﬀect the
source of volatility and growth, i.e. the portfolio choice between capital accumulation and
R&D, and can therefore be used to internalize externalities. All other taxes are welfare
reducing, given that they are used for some exogenous government expenditure (which, for
simplicity, is modelled to have no welfare or productivity eﬀect). When we look at the
eﬀects of taxes on volatility and welfare jointly, it turns out that stabilizing an economy
is not necessarily welfare increasing. Increasing a tax on wealth or factor income reduces
4welfare, but the tax on factor income increases volatility while the tax on wealth reduces
volatility. The objective of government intervention should be to internalize external eﬀects,
as in standard public ﬁnance approaches. The eﬃcient factor allocation would then be
characterized by a certain corresponding amount of volatility. The causal link from volatility
to welfare in the Lucas sense is therefore opened up with endogenous volatility and implies
that one can only talk of (positive or negative) correlations between volatility and welfare.
Clearly, the (in-)eﬃciency of ﬂuctuations has been discussed or analyzed at least since
Keynes’s General Theory. In contrast to the traditional RBC approach referred to above,
many authors have stressed various types of ineﬃciencies in the economy which arise or are
ampliﬁed because of ﬂuctuations. In the recent literature, Aghion, Banerjee and Picketty
(1999), also referred to above, argue that ﬂuctuations contain phases where "savings are
underutilized in the sense of being invested in an inferior asset". More quantitatively, Gali,
Gertler and Lopez (2003) compute gains from stabilization that arise because of an ineﬃcient
factor allocation and the asymmetry of changes in ineﬃciencies over the cycle. Greenwood
and Huﬀman (1991) study an economy whose ineﬃciency stems from taxation and ﬁnd that
a stabilization policy that builds on information about the current state of the economy is
welfare improving. None of these papers stresses the ineﬃciency resulting from the joint
endogeneity of long-run growth and short-run ﬂuctuations. With exogenous growth and
ﬂuctuations, ﬂuctuations are eﬃcient, with endogenous ﬂuctuations, they are not.
From a more positive (and not normative) perspective, understanding and explaining
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy has a long tradition as well. Greenwood and Huﬀman (1991)
ﬁnd, following a RBC-type calibration approach, that taxes on average amplify variability
of macroeconomic aggregates. Jones (2002) ﬁnds in his mainly econometric analysis that
ﬁscal policy in the US (captured by the tax rates on labour and capital income and gov-
ernment purchases from 1958 to 1997) has not stabilized the economy to a strong degree.
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) argue that increases in US government military
purchases increase tax rates on capital and labour income which in turn increase aggre-
gate hours worked and decrease real wages. They argue that the neoclassical growth model
can reasonably replicate these links. Fatás and Mihov (2003) empirically analyze the link
between discretionary government spending and volatility and ﬁnd that "aggressive use of
ﬁscal policy generates undesirable volatility and leads to lower economic growth". To the
best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper that proposes an explicit analytical expression
for volatility. This expression allows to understand the diﬀerent channels through which tax
policy aﬀects volatility. As we keep taxes constant, we highlight that a volatile economy is
not necessarily the result of large variations in tax rates over time but could be the result of
a too high or too low level of constant tax rates. Hence, breaks over time can result from a
single change of a tax rate and cross-country diﬀerences result from diﬀerences in tax levels.7
2T h e m o d e l
The model will be presented in three parts: technologies, the government and consumers.
As the technological setup of our economy is close to the one in Wälde (2005), the ﬁrst part
will be relatively brief. The introduction of government activities and the implications for
household behavior are new and will be presented in more detail.
7From a modeling perspective, the present paper uses the model developed in Wälde (2005) and extends
it for various tax rates and the government sector. The methods of Garcia and Griego (1994), on which most
of our results here are based, were not used in Wälde (2005).
52.1 Technologies
Technological progress is labour augmenting and embodied in capital. All capital goods can
be identiﬁed by a number denoting their date of manufacture and therefore their vintage.
A capital good Kj of vintage j allows workers to produce with a labour productivity Aj,
where A>1 is a constant parameter. Hence, a more modern vintage j +1implies a labour
productivity that is A times higher than labour productivity of vintage j. The corresponding
production function reads Yj = Kα
j (AjLj)1−α, where the amount of labour allocated to that
vintage is denoted by Lj and 0 <α<1 is the output elasticity of capital. The sum of labour
employment Lj per vintage equals aggregate constant labour supply,
Pq
j=0 Lj = L where q
is the most advanced vintage currently available.
Independently of which vintage is used, the same type of output is produced. Aggregate
output is used for producing consumption goods C, investment goods I, as an input R for
doing R&D and for government expenditures G,
C + I + R + G = Y = Σ
q
j=0Yj. (1)
The quantities C, I and R stand for net resources used for these activities, i.e. after taxation.
All activities in the economy take place under perfect competition. The producer prices of
the production, consumption, investment and research good will therefore be identical,
pY = pC = pI = pR. (2)
R&D is a risky activity. This is modelled by the Poisson process q where the probability
per unit of time dt of an innovation, i.e. of successful R&D, is given by λdt,w h e r eλ is the
arrival rate of q. At the level of an individual R&D ﬁrm f, there are constant returns to
scale and the ﬁrm arrival rate is λf = D−1h(R/D)Rf, where D captures the ”diﬃculty”
of doing R&D, h(·) is an externality and Rf are resources used by the ﬁrm. The diﬃculty
function D and the externality h(·) are taken as given. As ﬁrm-level Poisson processes qf














, 0 <γ<1, (3)
at the sectoral level where h(·) implies decreasing returns to scale.
The exogenous function D captures the diﬃculty to make an invention. Following the
arguments in Segerstrom (1998), an economy that discovered already many innovations needs
to put more eﬀort into a new innovation if this innovation is to come at the same rate λ.
While the amount of innovations in the past can be measured in diﬀerent ways, we simply
capture it by the tax-independent current size Kobs
∗ of the capital stock of the economy,
D ≡ D0K
obs
∗ ,D 0 > 0. (4)
This measure of the capital stock will be deﬁn e di n( 1 2 ) .
The objective of R&D is to develop capital goods that yield a higher labour productivity
than existing capital goods. When an innovation takes place, a ﬁrst prototype of a production
unit of size κ that yields a labour productivity of Aq+1 becomes available. This distinguishes
this approach from standard modeling of R&D where successful R&D is argued to lead
to a blueprint only. As seems to be common in many cases (Rosenberg, 1994), only the
development of a ﬁrst "pioneer plant" that can be used for production characterizes success
6of research. Technically, this implies that the capital stock of vintage q +1is a function of
the Poisson process q as well. The increment dq of this process can either be 0 or 1.A s
successful research means dq =1 ,w ec a nw r i t e
dKq+1 = κdq. (5)
T h es i z eo ft h ep r o t o t y p ei se x o g e n o u st ot h em o d e l . W ek e e pi tp r o p o r t i o n a lt ot h et a x -
independent size Kobs
∗ of the total capital stock,
κ ≡ κ0K
obs
∗ , 0 <κ 0 ¿ 1. (6)
When resources are allocated to capital accumulation, the capital stock of vintage j
increases if investment in vintage j exceeds depreciation δ,
dKj =( Ij − δKj)dt, j =0 ,...,q. (7)
In contrast to R&D, this is a deterministic process as capital accumulation simply means
replicating existing machines.
Allowing labour to be mobile across all vintages such that wage rates equalize, total




where vintage speciﬁc capital stocks have been aggregated to an aggregate capital index K,








This index can be thought of as counting the ”number of machines” of vintage 0 that would
be required to produce the same output Y as with the current mix of vintages.
The evolution of the capital index K follows from (5) and (7) by applying the change of
variable formula (CVF)8 to (9),
dK =( B
qI − δK)dt + B
q+1κdq. (10)
The capital index increases continuously as a function of eﬀective investment BqI minus
depreciation. When an innovation takes place, the capital index increases by Bq+1κ.
2.2 Government
The government can levy taxes on capital (τK) and labour income (τL), wealth (τW), con-
sumption expenditure (τC), investment (τI)a n dR & De x p e n d i t u r e( τR). A positive tax
implies a real decrease in income or an increase in the eﬀective price (consumer price),
whereas a negative tax is a subsidy. The government uses taxation to provide basic govern-
ment services G like rule of law. In order to focus on the eﬀects of taxation from government
expenditures, we assume that government expenditure does not aﬀect household utility or
production possibilities of the economy.
8In models with Brownian motion as a source of uncertainty, the ”rules” for computing diﬀerentials are
based on Ito’s Lemma. The expression Ito’s Lemma is inappropriate in the presence of Poisson processes
and the diﬀerentials are obtained from a change of variable formula. See e.g. Garcia and Griego (1994) and
Sennewald (2005) for a rigorous background and Sennewald and Wälde (2005) for an introduction.
7As argued in (2), producer prices are identical for all three production processes. When
consumption and investment goods C and I or research services R are sold, they are taxed
diﬀerently such that consumer prices are (1 + τC)pC, (1 + τI)pI, (1 + τR)pR. In order to
rule out arbitrage between diﬀerent types of goods, we assume that once a unit of production
is assigned for a special purpose, it is useless for other purposes: once a consumption good
is acquired, it cannot be used for e.g. investment purposes.
Taxes that increase the producer price have no theoretical upper bound. A 300% tax on
the consumption good would imply that 3/4 of the price are taxes going to the state and
1/4 goes to the producer. Their lower bound is clearly −100%, where a good would be for
free for the purchaser. The upper bound for taxes on income is 100% (instant conﬁscation
of income), while there is no lower bound. Hence, −1 <τ C,τI,τR and τL,τK,τW < 1.
Our capital stock index K in (9) measures the size of the capital stock in units of vintage
0. Measured in units of vintage q, its size is B−qK. This is also the value of the entire capital
stock in pre-tax units of the consumption good, as the relative pre-tax prices are unity from
(2). Measuring wealth in after-tax prices, i.e. in ”purchasing power” terms, the price of the
capital good increases by the tax τI and the price to be paid for one unit of the consumption
good increases by τC. Hence, total wealth in the economy is given by
K





where a is wealth of the representative household. The tax-independent measure of the









The economy is populated by a discrete ﬁnite number of suﬃciently small representative
households. They maximize expected utility U(t), given by the "sum" of instantaneous













,σ > 0. (14)
T h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n tr e ﬂects investment possibilities in this economy and the impact of
t a xp o l i c ya n ds h o w sh o ww e a l t ha evolves over time. Households can invest in a risky asset
by ﬁnancing R&D and in an (instantaneously) riskless asset by accumulating capital. We
measure wealth in units of the consumption good, priced at consumer prices. The budget
9For analytical convenience and readability, we neglect the term −(1 − σ)
−1 , which is sometimes included
in the instantaneous utility function.






































Nominal gross capital income
Pq+1
j=0 wK
j kj from all vintages j is taxed at τK, yielding net
capital income. Dividing by the consumer price (1 + τC)pC of the consumption good gives
real net capital income in units of the consumption good. The same reasoning applies to
labour income w, consumption c and investment i into R&D. The expression on the ﬁrst
line therefore captures the increase in wealth a, measured in units of the consumption good
at consumer prices. The ﬁrst expression on the second line captures the wealth-reducing
eﬀect of the after-tax depreciation rate and of the tax on wealth. The tax rates τK and τI
in front of the depreciation rate ensure that taxes are partly refunded i.e. only net (and not
gross) investment will be taxed (cf. eqs. (A.14) and (A.2)). The second expression increases
an individual’s wealth in case of successful research by the "dividend payments" minus an
economic depreciation term. Dividend payments at the household level are given by the share
i/R of the successful research project the household ﬁnanced times total dividend payments
1+τI
1+τCκ. Dividend payments are determined by the size κ of the prototype times its after-
tax price (1 + τI)/(1 + τC) in units of the consumption good.10 The term 1+τI implies
that research yields not only a capital good (which would have a value of pI) but already an
installed capital good (whose value is (1 + τI)pI). Economic depreciation (B − 1)/B results
from the vintage capital structure as the most advanced capital good has a relative price of
unity (cf. (2)) and all other vintages then lose in value relative to the consumption good.
After some further steps (especially the pricing equations for vj), and using the notation
















1+τCκ, s ≡ B−1


















3 Endogenous cyclical growth
3.1 Equilibrium
Solving the model requires ﬁrst order conditions for households for consumption and R&D
expenditure. These two conditions, together with the aggregate capital accumulation con-
straint (10), the goods market equilibrium (1), optimality conditions of perfectly competitive
ﬁrms and a certain taxation policy ﬁxing G provides a system consisting of 7 equations that
determines, given initial conditions, the time paths of K, C, R, Y, T, w and r.
10We use the term dividend payments in a narrow sense, i.e. only for payments from successful R&D.
Data on dividend payments would also include part of factor rewards r for capital.
9Such a system can best be understood by introducing auxiliary variables that are similarly
used in many other models as well: In the classic Solow growth model, capital per eﬀective
worker K/(AL) is shown to converge to a steady state and the analysis of e.g. convergence
can be separated from the analysis of long-run growth. In the present context, we deﬁne
ˆ K (τ) and ˆ C (τ) as
ˆ K (t) ≡ K (t)/A
q(t)/α, ˆ C (t) ≡ C (t)/A
q(t) (17)
which is almost identical to capital and consumption per eﬀective worker as labor supply is
constant here. These variables also allow us to separate the analysis of cyclical properties
of the model from long-run growth. Most of the time, we will call ˆ K (τ) and ˆ C (τ) cyclical
components of K (t) and C (t), as Aq(t)/α and Aq(t) will turn out to be the stochastic trend
in our economy.
”Detrending” in (17) is undertaken by dividing by measures of the current technology
level that diﬀers between capital and consumption. This is due to the fact that K (t) is a
capital index and not capital expressed in units of the consumption good. Capital measured
in units of the consumption good would be detrended by Aq(t) as well. When detrending other
endogenous variables by Aq(t) as well, these detrended variables turn out to be stationary
and within a bounded range. Equilibrium properties can therefore best be illustrated by
studying an equilibrium in cyclical components which consists of a system in 7 equations
and 7 cyclical components as well.
3.2 An explicit solution
It would be interesting to analyze such a system in all generality. One would run the risk,
however, of losing the big picture and rather be overwhelmed by many small results. We
therefore restrict ourselves to a particular parameter set of the model that allows very sharp
analytical results.
Theorem 1 If the preference parameter σ of the utility function satisﬁes the relationship
σ =
(1 − τK)α
1 − τL − (τK − τL)α
, (18)
we obtain a linear solution for consumption and research
ˆ C = Ψ ˆ K, ˆ R = Γ ˆ K, (19)















































w h e r ew ed e ﬁned
ξ ≡ 1 − s + κ0. (23)
10Proof. App. B.1.4.
Parameter restrictions as in (18) have proven useful to derive equilibrium properties which
otherwise would not be easily visible (e.g. Long and Plosser, 1983; Xie, 1991; Benhabib and
Rustichini, 1994; Wälde, 2005). What is peculiar about this condition is that a change
in the tax rate τL or τK would at constant α require a change in σ for the closed form
solution to prevail. As a change in preference or technology parameters following a change
in policy is not convincing, we will restrict our policy analyses to identical income tax rates,
i.e. τL = τK ≡ τF. This simpliﬁes (18) to11
σ = α. (24)
We will assume in what follows that ξ<1 in (23), i.e. economic depreciation s due to the
innovation is larger than the relative size of dividend payments κ0.
3.3 Cyclical growth
Exploiting the implications of theorem 1 fully, we can summarize general-equilibrium behav-
iour of agents in a way as simple as e.g. in the Solow growth model with exogenous growth
a n dac o n s t a n ts a v i n gr a t e ,e v e nt h o u g hw eh a v ef o r w a r d - l o o k i n ga g e n t sa n da nu n c e r t a i n
environment. In terms of cyclical components, our economy follows (19) and (app. B.1.3)
d ˆ K =
³






















¢ ˆ Kdq, (26)
































The diﬀerential equation (25) is the capital accumulation constraint (10), expressed for
cyclical components and satisfying utility-maximizing behaviour of agents. Inserting (19)
and some further steps (app. B.2.1) give the one-dimensional stochastic diﬀerential equation
(26) in ˆ K.
Note that the expressions containing parameters b0 and b1 have an economic meaning:
the ﬁrst term represents cyclical output of this economy, reduced by taxation. This is visible
from ˆ Y = ˆ KαL1−α (app. B.1.3). The b1 term represents resource allocation to R&D and
consumption, in addition to physical capital depreciation, all corrected for taxation. As
(26) shows, b1 also captures the speed of convergence of ˆ K relative to its steady state. The
11The parameter restriction σ = α implies a relatively high intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ−1 of
above unity. Wether the intertemporal elasticity of substitution implied by this restriction is plausible or not
(for a discussion, see Wälde, 2005), the relevance of our results depends only on whether one believes that
changes in σ will fundamentally change our insights. As will turn out further below, this is not the case.
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Figure 1: General equilibrium dynamics of the capital stock per eﬀective worker and GDP
growth cycles
The ﬁgure on the left plots ˆ K on the horizontal axis and the proportional (deterministic
part of the) change d ˆ K/ˆ K on the vertical one. The steady state ˆ K∗ to which the economy


























where we used (28) for the second equality.
We can now start our analysis as we do in deterministic models. Assume an initial capital
stock ˆ K0. Agents invest part of their savings in R&D, the rest goes to capital accumulation.
Assuming a certain length of time without jumps, i.e. without successful innovation, the
economy grows due to more capital and converges to the steady state ˆ K∗. As in the Solow
model, growth is initially high and approaches zero. Once a jump occurs and q increases
by 1, the capital stock of the economy increases by the size κ of the prototype from (5). If
the capital stock K remained unchanged, capital per eﬀective worker ˆ K (τ) from (17) would
decreases by a discrete amount as the frontier technology increases by the discrete amount
A. When we assume that the size of the new machine is suﬃciently small relative to the
technological improvement, A−1ξ<1 (which is the only empirically plausible assumption
and which also follows from our assumption after (23)), the cyclical component ˆ K (τ) falls
due to an innovation, i.e. the economy is thrown back towards the origin in ﬁg. 1. With a
lower capital stock per eﬀective worker, investment in capital accumulation becomes more
proﬁtable as the marginal productivity of capital is higher. Growth rates jump to a higher
level and approach zero again unless a new innovation takes place.
The discrete increases of labour productivity by A imply a step function in TFP - in
contrast to the smooth increase in TFP in balanced growth models. The implied evolution
of GDP is shown in the right panel of ﬁg. 1. Fluctuations are natural in a growing economy.
124 Measuring welfare and volatility
4.1 The value function
O u rm e a s u r eo fw e l f a r ei st h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nw h i c h ,b yd e ﬁnition, is V (t) ≡ max{c(τ),i(τ)}
Et
R ∞
t e−ρ[τ−t]u(c(τ))dτ. Pulling the expectations operator into the integral gives






Obviously, the value of the optimal program depends on the evolution of expected instanta-
neous utility, Etu(c(τ)).12
4.1.1 Evolution of expected instantaneous utility
Let us now analyze how expected instantaneous utility,
m1 (τ) ≡ Etu(c(τ)), (31)
evolves. For notational simplicity, we denote
Θ ≡ A
1−σ, Ξ = ξ
1−σ. (32)
Computing expected quantities as in (31) can be done in two ways. Either, a stochastic
diﬀerential equation is expressed in its integral version, expectations operators are applied
and the resulting deterministic diﬀerential equation is solved. Or, the stochastic diﬀerential
equation is solved directly and then expectation operators are applied. The background for
either approach is in Garcia and Griego (1994). We follow the ﬁrst way here.







dt − b2u(t)dq(t), (33)
where b0 and b1 are as in (27) and (28) and
b2 ≡ 1 − Ξ (34)
can be understood as a measure of the "novelty" of a new technology. When A is high, b2
is high as well as a high degree of novelty increases b2 t h r o u g hh i g he c o n o m i cd e p r e c i a t i o n
s, deﬁned before (16). Note that we assume b2 > 0 which holds due to the plausibility
assumption of ξ<1 made after (23). This diﬀerential equation shows that u(t) behaves
similarly to ˆ K illustrated in ﬁg. 1. Starting from some u0,u(t) m o v e st o w a r d st h ec u r r e n t
steady state b0Θq(t)/b1 as long as no technology jump takes place, i.e. as long as dq =0 .W h e n
q jumps, u(t) reduces by a small amount as agents postpone consumption13 and as a fraction
12The integral and the expectations operator can be exchanged when, under a technical condition, both
the expected integral, i.e. our objective function (13), and the integral of the expected expression exist. The
expected integral exists by assumption as otherwise the maximization problem of the household would be
meaningless. The existence of the integral of the expected expression will be shown by computing it. The
existence proof is therefore an ex-post proof. We are grateful to Ken Sennewald for discussions of this issue.
13This is due to σ = α and the implied intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Under an alternative
condition and closed form solution, consumption would not decrease (Wälde, 2005, footnote 20). The
behavior of the utility level after a technological jump is not important for subsequent results. The σ = α
assumption would also matter for the link between growth and uncertainty (cf. e.g. de Hek 1999).
13of their wealth depreciates economically. The diﬀerence to ˆ K consists in the behaviour of the
current steady state. As u(t) is the level of utility and not its cyclical component or utility
per representative worker, the steady state moves to the right with each new technology.
A f t e ra ni n n o v a t i o na n dt h es u b s e q u e n tr e d u c t i o ni nu(t), instantaneous utility approaches
this new steady state until the next jump occurs - similar to GDP in ﬁg. 1.
Given this stochastic diﬀerential equation and forming expectations about u(τ) for τ>t
leads to a deterministic ordinary diﬀerential equation in m1 (τ). Computing a solution for
this ODE is possible as its non-linearity can be removed by a variable transformation similar
to the approach for the deterministic Solow growth model (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1995, p. 53). Deﬁning g a st h eg r o w t hr a t ea n dβ as the convergence rate of expected utility
m1(τ) (and keeping the diﬀerence to b1 in (28), the speed of convergence of ˆ K, in mind),
g ≡ (Θ − 1)λ, (35)
β ≡ g + b1 + b2λ = b1 + λ[Θ − Ξ], (36)
respectively, we obtain (app. 7.1) an explicit expression for (31),
m1(τ)=e





The second term of this equation, eg[τ−t]µ, says that expected utility, starting in t where
q(t) and K (t) and thereby u(t) are given as initial conditions, grows exponentially at the
innovation rate g. From (35), the innovation rate is basically driven by the arrival rate λ.I n
the long run, g is the average growth rate of instantaneous utility. The ﬁrst term says that
u(t) converges to µ at the convergence rate β. The term µ is the expected value, today in t,
of instantaneous utility in τ →∞ , when instantaneous utility is deterministically detrended.
This follows immediately from rewriting (37) as e−g[τ−t]m1(τ)=e−β[τ−t] (u(t) − µ)+µ.14
Somewhat imprecisely but nevertheless useful, µ could be called "average instantaneous
utility".
Apart from showing growth of expected quantities in our setup, equation (37) illustrates
the similarity of the evolution of expected quantities in this setup to the evolution of quan-
tities in the Solow growth model. When we replace µ by the Solow steady state utility level,
the expected evolution here is identical to the certain evolution in Solow’s model (where g
and β would then stand for the growth and convergence rate in the Solow sense). In contrast
to Solow, the role played by short-run convergence is ambiguous: while in the Solow model
one usually assumes a capital stock that lies to the left of the steady state and convergence
implies higher average growth rates between today and some future point in time τ, the cap-
ital stock here (and the implied consumption and utility level) will in 50% of all realizations
lie to the right of the mean µ. Convergence then implies lower average growth rates.
14Obviously, detrending is possible in at least two ways here: The ”stochastic detrending” in (17) looks at
past realizations of q (t) and removes the stochastic trend Aq(t)/α or Aq(t) of some stochastic trended variable
X (t). ”Deterministic detrending” removes an expected growth trend by dividing expected expressions by its
growth component eg[τ−t]. In either case, by deﬁnition, the resulting cyclical component has a ﬁnite constant
long-run mean. Stochastic detrending also implies ﬁnite and constant higher long-run moments (app. 7.3),
which, however, is not necessarily the case for deterministic detrending (app. 7.2).
144.1.2 Computing the value function
We can now insert the expression for utility under optimal behaviour from (37) into (30)






ρ − g + β
. (39)
The derivation assumed ρ>gwhich makes the integral in (13) bounded.15 While in de-
terministic models the growth rate of utility must not be larger than the time preference
rate, in this stochastic model, the boundedness condition requires that the growth rate of
expected instantaneous utility must not exceed the time preference rate.
T h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nc a nb e s tb eu n d e r s t o o db yg o i n gb a c kt oe q u a t i o n( 3 7 ) :T h ev a l u e
to which the expected value of deterministically detrended utility converges is µ. This value
appears in (39) as µ/(ρ − g), i.e. the present value of utility that amounts to µ today,
grows at rate g a n dw h e r et h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ri sρ. In addition, welfare today depends on
a convergence term. If utility today is lower than µ, there will be convergence towards this
long-run mean and utility will be lower compared to a situation where u(t) equals or exceeds
µ. However, the diﬀerence µ−u(t) is not as important as µ i nt h eo t h e rt e r m ,a st h i se ﬀect
is transitory. Hence, the present value of the convergence process is computed subject to the
convergence rate β.
Note that an identical expression for the value function would result in an analysis of the
Solow model. The only diﬀerence would consist in the meaning of µ. While here, µ stands
for "average instantaneous utility", it would stand for steady state utility in Solow’s model.
Summarizing, the value of the optimal program V (t) basically depends on four crucial
determinants: "average instantaneous utility" µ, utility today u(t), the innovation rate g and
the convergence coeﬃcient β. Studying welfare eﬀects of taxation can therefore be broken
down into eﬀects on these four elements that determine the value function.
4.2 The cyclical component
While the measure for welfare was straightforward, there is an almost inﬁnite number of
possible measures of volatility. The empirically oriented literature provides two examples:
The variance of growth rates (e.g. of GDP) and the variance of cyclical components. App.
7.2 analyses the variance of the growth rate of instantaneous utility u in detail. It turns out
that the resulting expression and therefore variances of all other time-series like e.g. GDP,
do not lend themselves to a straightforward analysis. This is due to two facts. First, growth
rates for long time horizons, i.e. for τ →∞ , do approach a constant mean but do not
have ﬁnite variance or ﬁnite higher moments. Second, while annual growth rates have ﬁnite
moments, they are extremely complex (cf. equ. (52)) and a comparative static analysis is
close to intractable. We therefore use cyclical components as our basic random variable to
measure volatility.
4.2.1 The evolution of the cyclical component
Cyclical components of time series can be deﬁned and therefore computed in many ways
and the literature oﬀers a large number of ﬁlters. None of these ﬁlters, given their computa-
tional complexity, would allow us to derive cyclical components that would yield an explicit
15Hence, the integral of the expected expression exists. See footnote 12.
15analytical expression for volatility. We therefore use a very simple ﬁlter, the Solow-type
detrending rule used in (17), to compute our cyclical components. Usual ﬁlters, think of the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁl t e r ,d e t r e n db yr e m o v i n gas m o o t ht r e n df r o mat i m es e r i e s .O u rﬁlter
captures the trend by a step function Aq(t), caused by the discrete increases of q(t). In spirit,
however, these ﬁlters are very close as both remove past realizations of growth processes to
obtain the cyclical components.
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Figure 2: Detrended utility
In order to understand the detrending method proposed here, we look at the evolution
of detrended utility.16 We deﬁne detrended individual utility, in analogy to (14), as the






ˆ b2 ≡ 1 − Ξ/Θ, (41)
detrended utility follows (app. 7.3)
dˆ u(t)=( b0 − b1ˆ u(t))dt −ˆ b2ˆ u(t)dq(t). (42)
This law of motion is basically identical to (33), only that the Θq(t) term is missing and ˆ b2
slightly diﬀers from b2. Again, we can gain an intuitive understanding by plotting in ﬁg. 2
the deterministic part (b0 − b1ˆ u(t)) with ˆ u(t) on the horizontal axis.
Obviously, the cyclical component of utility has a range between 0 and b0/b1, pro-
vided that ˆ u0 lies within this range. Starting from ˆ u0 and as long as no innovation takes





ˆ u(t), i.e. Ξ/Θ percent of its level before the innovation. As the reduction is
proportional, ˆ u(t) is always positive.
16In Lucas-type approaches, the measure of volatility is based on the evolution of consumption. For
analytical tractability, we need to work with detrended utility. There are approximation rules, however,
which allow to compute e.g. the coeﬃcient of variation of consumption once the coeﬃcient of variation of
utility (a monotone transformation of consumption) is known (cf. e.g. Rinne, 1997).
164.2.2 The coeﬃcient of variation
Exploiting again the methods in Garcia and Griego (1994), we can compute moments of this
cyclical component. This follows similar step as above for (37). In fact, denoting the ith
moment, in analogy to (31), by
ˆ mi(τ) ≡ Etˆ u(τ)
i , (43)
the ﬁrst and second moment are given in the long run by (app. 7.3.2)17
ˆ m1 (∞)=
b0






1 − (1 −ˆ b2)2
i ˆ m1 (∞). (45)
Using these moments, computing the variance would be straightforward. As a measure of
volatility, the variance seems less suitable in our context, however, as it is scale dependent.
We therefore prefer the coeﬃcient of variation (cv). Given that the variance of a random








2 − 1. (46)
When computing the second moment in all generality, an expression similarly complex
as for the variance of the growth rate, presented in the appendix in (52) appears. When
w ef o c u so nt h el o n gr u nw h e r et h ec o n v e r g e n c eo ft h ei n i t i a lv a l u eˆ u0 to ˆ m1 (∞) in (42) is
ignored, however, this measure simpliﬁe s .T h i sw o u l db et h ec a s ef o rt h ev a r i a n c eo fg r o w t h
rates as well, see (53). Studying the long run with this measure of volatility is not at all as
problematic as using growth rates, however. In the latter case, we analyze the variance of
multi-annual growth rates. Those could never be observed. In the former case, looking at
the long run simply means studying the volatility of some stationary long-run distribution.
This corresponds to studying the variance of the cyclical component of a time series that is









To obtain a feeling for this measure, we go back to ﬁg. 2. The ﬁrst moment ˆ m1 (∞)
lies between 0 and the steady state b0/b1. This is intuitively clear, given the permanent
convergence towards b0/b1 and the occasional being thrown back. As the process ˆ u(t) is
completely described by (42), given an arrival rate λ, only the parameters of this process,
b0,b 1, ˆ b2 and λ, c a ns h o wu pi ni t sm o m e n t s .Al a r g e rb0 and a smaller b1 shifts the mean
ˆ m1 (∞) t ot h er i g h t ;t h i si sc l e a rf r o mﬁg. 2 as a larger b0 and a smaller b1 shift the dˆ u line
to the right. When ˆ b2 or λ increase, the mean shifts to the left as either jumps to the left
are larger or more frequent.
T h es e c o n dm o m e n th a st h es a m ep r o p e r t i e sa st h eﬁrst moment ˆ m1 (∞) with respect to




increases in ˆ b2, it
17The structure of the moments is remarkable as it shows that the distribution of ˆ u exists, is unique and
represents a generalization of the β-distribution. We are grateful to Christian Kleiber for pointing this out
to us. For more discussion see app. 7.3.2.
17also behaves as ˆ m1 (∞) with respect to ˆ b2, i.e. it decreases in ˆ b2. Simply speaking, a larger
range and more frequent jumps increase the second moment, a measure of dispersion.
Computing the cv t h e ns h o w st h a ti ti si n d e p e n d e n to fb0. This is not surprising as b0 is a
scaling parameter and the cv is by construction scale independent. This can intuitively also
be understood from ﬁg. 2 where the eﬀect of b0 on the cyclical component could be removed
by scaling both axes with 1/b0.T h ee ﬀect of other parameters will be discussed below.
4.2.3 Random walks and stationary cyclical components
Following the work of Nelson and Plosser (1982), the majority view seems to be now that
most observed macroeconomic time series exhibit diﬀerence-stationarity rather than trend-
stationarity.18 This implies that theoretical models should predict diﬀerence stationary time
paths as well, i.e. trends and cyclical components should both be stochastic as opposed to
models where only cyclical components are stochastic and the trend is deterministic. An
example of the latter type is given by King and Rebelo (1999), where the technology is
Yt = AtKα
t [NtXt]
1−α , labour productivity increases according to Xt+1 = γXt with γ>1
and TFP follows At = A
ρ
t−1eεt with ρ<1 and εt being normally iid. Models of the former
type are presented e.g. by King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991) where the log of TFP
is assumed to follow a exogenously given random walk with drift. Models with endogenous
stochastic trends include King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988, sect. 3.3), Fatás (2000) or Barlevy
(2004). Sources of ﬂuctuations are exogenous in these models.
We now show that our model exhibits indeed a stochastic trend and stochastic stationary
cyclical components. The crucial diﬀerence to models just cited is of course the endogeneity
of shocks to TFP. How often shocks occur, i.e. how often the technology jumps, depends on
decisions made by investors.19 The well-known Aghion-Howitt (1992) random technological
progress speciﬁcation can therefore also endogenously account, once properly included in a
model of growth and ﬂuctuations, for business cycle properties so far replicated only in an
exogenous way.
We can write (17) as lnK (t)=q(t)(lnA)/α +l nˆ K (t), i.e. we split our time series
lnK (t) i n t oat r e n dc o m p o n e n tq(t)(lnA)/α and into a stationary cyclical component
ln ˆ K (t), in the sense of Beveridge and Nelson (1981). Both the trend component and the
stationary component are stochastic. Even though we are in continuous time, we can easily
relate our trend component to a discrete time random walk as we can describe it by the pure
random walk with drift: q(t)=q(t − 1)+λ+ε(t), where ε(t) ∼ (0,λ).20 Hence, our trend
component has a unit root and our cyclical component ˆ K (t) is stationary as just shown for
ˆ u.
18More recent work on stationarity includes Bai and Ng (2004).
19Other models of endogenous ﬂuctuations and growth, all cited in the introduction, are of a deterministic
nature. The only exception is Bental and Peled (1996) who were the ﬁrst to study endogenous ﬂuctuations
and growth. Unfortunately, their model is fairly complex which makes an explicit analysis of stochastic
properties of trends and cycles a very hard task.
20The fact that the expectation and variance of q(t) − q(t − 1) are both equal to λ results from the
distributional properties of a Poisson process. If the increment of the trend term was not constant, i.e. if
e.g. A was vintage dependent and stochastic, the expectation and variance would diﬀer. This would be an
interesting extension for future work and should help in empirical applications.
185 Volatility, welfare and taxation
Given our measures of welfare and volatility derived in the last section, we can now ask how
taxation aﬀects these quantities.
5.1 Volatility and taxation
5.1.1 The volatility channels
Our central measure of volatility in (47) is aﬀected through three channels: the speed of
convergence b1, the altitude of the slump ˆ b2 and the arrival rate λ. The interpretation of
these parameters is based on (42) but other interpretations are possible. When we plot an
arbitrary realization of our cyclical components in ﬁg. 3, this becomes more transparent.
The range of our cyclical components is ]0,b 0/b1[. The upper limit corresponds to the
steady state ˆ K∗ for the cyclical component of capital in ﬁg. 1. Hence, b1 is at the same
time a measure of the range of the cyclical component (cf. ﬁg. 2, remembering that b0 is
only a scaling parameter) and thereby of its amplitude. The arrival rate λ also measures the
expected number of jumps or (the inverse of) the expected length of a cycle. The simple
reason why volatility depends on taxation is therefore the same reason why the steady state
capital stock (29) (i.e. the speed of convergence), the novelty of a new technology or the
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Figure 3: The cyclical components and their determinants b1, ˆ b2 and λ
When we want to understand the eﬀects of taxation, we can restrict attention to b1 and
λ as ˆ b2 is independent of taxation. The independence of ˆ b2 (and of b2)f r o mt a x e sf o l l o w s
from their deﬁnitions in (34) and (41) and the fact that ξ from (23), with s from (16) and
κ0 from (6), is independent of tax rates. Economically, this independence of ˆ b2 follows from
t h ef a c tt h a td i v i d e n dp a y m e n t sκ are not taxed and that economic depreciation s does not
imply tax-exemption as does physical depreciation δ.
The tax eﬀects on the arrival rate λ are straightforward from looking at (22) and are
summarized in table 1. As the growth rate g of expected utility has λ as its only tax-
dependent determinant, it has the same qualitative properties and is also included in the
table. The composite parameter b1 in (28) depends on taxes both directly and indirectly
through the arrival rate. When we insert (22) into (28), we obtain unambiguous results,
19except for τI (app. D.1.1).
τL = τK
(∗) τC τR τI τW
b1 − 0 − +(1) +
b2, ˆ b2 00 0 0 0
g, λ 00 − +0
volatility +0 − + −
welfare −− ±± −
(∗)only joint changes of τL and τK can be studied, see (24)
(1) for high τI or τK and low δ
Table 1: Taxation eﬀects on composite parameters, the arrival rate, volatility and welfare
5.1.2 Comparative statics
L e tu sn o wc o m b i n et h ee ﬀects of these three channels on volatility. As we have only two
tax-dependent channels, b1 and λ, taxation can aﬀect volatility by either changing λ or b1
(without the λ in b1), or both. Clearly, when a tax has no eﬀect on b1 and λ,t h ecv is not
aﬀected by this tax either. This is the case for taxation of consumption.
When taxing wealth, the arrival rate and the ”slump parameter” ˆ b2 are not aﬀected,
while the (inverse) range parameter b1 increases and, as a consequence, volatility goes down.
Economically speaking, a tax on wealth decreases the households’ return r∗ in (16) on savings
and thereby implies a lower steady-state cyclical capital stock and utility level ˆ u.H o l d i n g
constant the length of a cycle but "squeezing" the cyclical components in ﬁg. 3, the relative
dispersion must be lower.
An increase in the income tax on capital and labour reduces the range parameter b1 but
not the arrival rate λ. As a consequence, volatility unambiguously increases in this tax.
How can this result be understood? The speed of convergence b1 in (28) reduces for two
reasons: (i) only net investment is taxed (as discussed before (15)), i.e. a higher tax on
capital increases the positive eﬀect of the refunding policy and reduces the impact of the
depreciation rate δ as visible in (28). A lower (eﬀective) depreciation rate increases incentives
for capital accumulation and the steady-state capital stock increases. (ii) Due to our σ = α
restriction, direct eﬀects of joint changes in capital and labour taxation just cancel out and
only this indirect refunding eﬀect is left over. Clearly, this second eﬀe c tw o u l dn o ts u r v i v e
for α 6= σ and τK 6= τL and should potentially overcompensate the ﬁrst eﬀect. Hence,
currently, the eﬀect of income taxation is the opposite of wealth taxation but should go in
similar directions for more general cases.
When analyzing R&D and investment taxes τR and τI, results are at ﬁrst sight less clear-
c u ta st h e s et a x e sa ﬀect the arrival rate which aﬀects the cv directly positively and indirectly
negatively through λ. Computing the derivatives, however, we get unambiguous results as
presented in table 1 above (app. D.1.2). The analytics for τR say in words: a higher tax on
research depresses the arrival rate. When the arrival rate falls, the ratio b1/λ increases and
the cv falls. Intuitively, a higher τR makes investment in research less proﬁtable and the
arrival rate λ falls. Less frequent jumps in technology imply a lower volatility. A lower λ also
decreases b1 which by ﬁg. 3 implies a larger range b0/b1 and higher volatility. This is because
b1 represents physical depreciation but also consumption and expenditure for research. A
lower λ therefore implies ceteris paribus a lower b1. This second indirect eﬀect, however, is
20not large enough such that the direct volatility decreasing eﬀect of higher taxes on research
dominates.
Given the explanations for the previous ﬁnding, understanding the result for τI is also
easy: a higher tax on investment increases the arrival rate which again has a direct and an
indirect eﬀect on volatility. The direct eﬀect via the frequency of jumps overcompensates
t h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect on the range and volatility increases. The additional eﬀect of taxation on
investment via the depreciation rate δ makes the range increasing eﬀect of a higher λ less
strong such that the indirect eﬀect is even weaker than under a change of τR. Consequently,
volatility falls more when τI increases as when τR falls.
If growth and volatility were exogenous, i.e. if there was an arrival rate given by λ
without any resources R being required for R&D, the model would from its basic structure
resemble a simple RBC model. Any activity takes place under perfect competition and labour
productivity improves by discrete amounts at random points in time. Volatility would still
be aﬀected by taxation as the arrival rate is only one out of three channels in our measure of
volatility (47).21 As argued in the introduction, however, an endogenous arrival rate allows
us to investigate whether taxes can explain a break in volatility without aﬀecting the growth
rate. As McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) argue, there was a break in volatility in the
US in 1984 without a break in the trend of GDP. Hence, given our results in table 1, this
model predicts falling income taxes τL = τK and rising wealth taxes τW to reduce volatility
without aﬀecting trend growth.
5.1.3 Quantitative importance
This section takes a ﬁrst look at the quantitative properties of our model and asks whether
changes in tax rates can have eﬀects that are "suﬃciently large". Clearly, our analytically
convinient approach of assuming the parameter restriction (24) imposes strong restrictions
for calibration purposes. Calibration here is also more ambitous than in standard circum-
stances as we have additional statistical properties of observed economies which we want to
match: Table 2 shows on the left-hand side that the average (expected) length of a cycle
a n dg r o w t hr a t eg and the tax elasticitiy of the growth rate enter as central predictions of
the model. Reasonable values are obtained by choosing A, D0 and the externality measure
γ (cf. app. D.1.3 for details) 22. Initial tax rates and exogenous parameters were set at
(τI,τR,τC,τF,τW)=( .15,.00,.15,.30,.01) and (α,δ,ρ,κ0)=( .5,.075,.03,10−12), respec-
tively. The exogenous parameter values for δ and ρ are standard. The value for α depends
on whether one perceives human capital to be captured by K as well. We set it somewhat
higher than the pure national account value of .3. Intuitively, the size of the new machine κ
is small relative to the capital stock in the economy as a whole. This explains the low value
for κ0.
imposed calibrated
E length of cycle E growth tax elasticity of λ AD 0 γ
5 years 3% 0.33 1.16 1.55 × 10-10 .75
Table 2: A simple calibration
21The amount of volatility would therefore remain endogenous even in this exogenous shock economy.
Volatility could, however, no longer be called "natural" as its source is exogenously imposed on the economy.
22Regression analyses show that the eﬀect of taxation on growth is not without controversy: see e.g.
Mendoza et. al. (1994) and Padovano and Galli (2001) for a survey.














Figure 4: Quantitative dependence of the cv on tax rates
Given these parameter values, ﬁg. 4 shows the coeﬃcient of variation as a function of tax
rates. Taxes vary from −1 (a subsidy) to 1.T h ec o e ﬃcient of variation (cv) of the baseline
calibration is .13.T h ec o e ﬃcient of variation for an HP-ﬁltered cyclical component of real
GDP for the U.S. economy decreased from about .4 in the 1955:2-1984:1 period to about .2
in 1984:2-2004:2. The decline in the variance of quarterly growth rates are of similar pattern
(see e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000). This implies that endogenous ﬂuctuations
of our model match roughly 33% to 65% of observed ﬂuctuations (dividing .13 by .4 and
.2). This is remarkable given the absence of exogenous sources of volatility or the σ = α
restriction.
Some tax rates, i.e. the tax on research τR a n dt h et a xo nw e a l t hτW reduce the cv of the
baseline calibration potentially by 10% and 60%, respectively. Other tax rates, i.e. the tax on
investment τI and the factor income tax τF increase the cv: a decrease of τF by 10 percentage
points decreases the cv roughly by 3%. The break in volatility in the US could therefore be
explained quantitatively only to some extent. It should be remembered, however, that tax
eﬀects enter only through the arrival rate λ and the speed of convergence b1.E ﬀects of τR
and τI on λ are small by construction whereas eﬀects on b1 in (28) are - due to our explicit
σ = α solution - only through τW, the arrival rate λ, and the refunding eﬀect, as direct eﬀects
of τF just cancel out. The consumption tax τC does not aﬀect the cv at all as the labour-
leisure choice is not modelled. We summarize our quantitative ﬁndings by stating that the
l e v e lo ft a xr a t e sd o e sh a v ea ne ﬀect on volatility. A more elaborate calibration exercise (no
parameter restriction, endogenous labour and some exogenous source of volatility) is needed,
however, before the quantitative importance can be judged more convincingly.
5.2 Volatility and welfare
5.2.1 The welfare channels and comparative statics
When we look at our measure of welfare (39), it is aﬀected by taxation through four quan-
tities, average instantaneous utility µ, current utility u(c(t)),a n dg and β, the growth and
convergence rate. These four quantities in turn depend on four channels, b0,b 1,λand Ψ.
We could now, following the approach from our measure of volatility, analyze the eﬀects
of taxation on these channels ﬁrst and then combine the results and derive conclusions for
22welfare. As this does not yield additional insight, we directly link welfare to taxation by the
following
Theorem 2 (Taxation and welfare) A tax reduces welfare (39) when the permanent com-
ponent of welfare µ/(ρ − g) falls faster or increases less fast than the transition component









































(ρ − g + β)2 .
Proof. app. D.2
The left-hand side is the derivative of the permanent component of welfare, the right-
hand side is the derivative of the transition component (where both sides are divided by µ).
Both derivatives can be both negative or positive.
Going through these derivatives for individual taxes shows that (compare table 1 and
app. D.2) taxes on factor income, consumption and wealth have unambiguous negative ef-
fects on welfare while taxes on investment and R&D can increase welfare. Taxes τF,τ C
and τW decrease welfare as resources are taken away from households and G has in the
model no productivity- or utility-enhancing eﬀect. The potentially welfare increasing eﬀect
of τI and τR can best be understood when looking at the ﬁrst order condition for invest-
ment in research: in our decentralized setup, the ﬁrst order condition (1 + τR)Va (a(t),q)
= λV˜ a (˜ a,q +1 )
(1+τI)κ
R from (A.17) shows that individuals invest in R&D because of dividend
payments κ∗, their increased wealth ˜ a and the better technology q+1. Optimal investment in
a planner economy, where the planner maximizes the Bellman equation (A.15) with respect
to R rather than i and where Σa(t) stands for wealth in the economy as a whole, would
satisfy VΣa (Σa(t),q)= ∂λ
∂R [V (Σ˜ a,q +1 )− V (Σa,q)]. Incentives to do research therefore
results from ∂λ/∂R, the eﬀect of more resources on the probability λ to ﬁnd a new tech-
nology, and the diﬀerence in well-being between a situation with more wealth and a better
technology, V (Σ˜ a,q +1 ), and today, V (Σa,q). While there are certainly various opposing
eﬀects, externalities are strongest for this trade-oﬀ between capital accumulation and R&D.
It is therefore not surprising, that taxes τI and τR which are directly aﬀecting this ﬁrst order
condition are best suited to potentially internalize externalities.
As the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption is identical for the planner and the repre-
sentative household, there are no externalities or imperfections present in the model apart
from those visible in the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst order conditions for R&D. Put diﬀer-
ently, if the arrival rate equalled λ exogenously without any resources R being allocated to
R&D, the decentralized economy would be eﬃcient. This RBC-type version of our model
would then predict that ﬂuctuations allow for an optimal adjustment by individuals to ex-
ogenous disturbances. If one believes, however, that the process of ﬁnding and developing
new technologies implies certain externalities (and that new technologies at least partially
induce ﬂuctuations), factor allocations in an economy ”growing through cycles”, to use Mat-
suyama’s (1999) words, are ineﬃcient.
235.2.2 The tax-link between volatility and welfare
Given the ineﬃciency of ﬂuctuations, should taxes be used to stabilize the economy? In the
literature, more volatility is usually associated with lower welfare: In perfect-market models
(Lucas, 1987, 2003 or, more recently, Epaulard and Pommeret, 2003 and Barlevy, 2004),
exogenous volatility implies ﬂuctuations of consumption and the curvature of the utility
function implies lower welfare than in an economy without ﬂuctuations but identical average
growth. Gali et al. (2003) focus on ineﬃciencies and argue - due to the ineﬃciency of the
steady state and the larger welfare losses in recessions than welfare gains in booms - that
ﬂuctuations on average cause welfare losses.
This is not necessarily the case when ﬂuctuations are endogenous: While the curvature of
the utility function à la Lucas and the asymmetry as in Gali (and others) is welfare-reducing
in our setup as well, volatility is only the result of the more fundamental factor allocation
in an economy. Asking whether volatility is welfare reducing and by how much is therefore
meaningful only if one believes that the sources of ﬂuctuations are exogenous to an economy
(which, in the real world, they are - to a certain extent). The welfare eﬀects of endogenous
ﬂuctuations, however, can only be understood when understanding the welfare properties of
the underlying factor allocation that causes these ﬂuctuations. When this is done, it becomes
clear that more or less ﬂuctuations can be associated (and are not causal as in the exogenous
ﬂuctuation case) with higher or lower welfare. Tax policy should therefore not be used in all
cases to stabilize the economy.
This association between welfare and volatility, illustrated for taxes with unambiguous
welfare eﬀects, is depicted in the following ﬁgure.
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Figure 5: Welfare, volatility and taxation - anything goes
Arrows indicate in which direction to move on the line when the tax is increased. Fig. 5
shows that there is no association between volatility and welfare in general. It all depends
on the source of the change in volatility. While certain taxes increase volatility and reduce
welfare (τF), others reduce volatility but still decrease welfare (τW). Lowering the tax on
wealth increases welfare as fewer resources are taken away from the economy as argued
above. At the same time, volatility increases as the steady state capital stock (29) increases.
Hence, despite the curvature of the utility function and the asymmetric eﬀect of volatility
on eﬃciency, more volatility implies higher welfare.
246C o n c l u s i o n
Growth rates above and below long-run trends are a common feature of all real-world
economies. The present paper used a model that perceives endogenous ﬂuctuations as a
natural phenomenon of all endogenously growing economies by stipulating that new tech-
nologies increase labour productivity in a discrete way. Agents in this setup are not solely
responding to shocks but rather are the source of shocks, i.e. jumps in technologies, due
to their ﬁnancing of innovation and growth. This framework was used to analyze the ef-
fects of taxation on volatility and the associated welfare eﬀects. Due to a sharp decrease of
volatility in the US and an almost simultaneous strong tax reform, taxation was expected
to potentially explain part of the ’big moderation’ starting in 1983.
We used the coeﬃcient of variation of the cyclical component of a typical time series as
our measure of volatility. It was shown that this measure is most tractable from a theoretical
perspective and that three economically meaningful channels aﬀect this measure: potential
range of cyclical components, slumps and frequency of new technologies. Taxes aﬀect these
channels in various ways which allows, inter alia, to understand a change in volatility without
requiring a simultaneous change in the growth rate of the economy.
Welfare eﬀects associated with changes in volatility can be manifold. In a special case
of our model where the source of long-run growth and short-run ﬂuctuations is exogenous,
factor allocation is eﬃcient and volatility does not signal the need for stabilization. With
endogenous growth and ﬂuctuations, however, ineﬃciencies enter the economy and ﬂuctua-
tions hint at the possibility of welfare-increasing policy measures, even though all production
and R&D activities were modelled to take place under perfect competition.
Stabilization is not necessarily welfare increasing, however: Lower volatility can imply
higher or lower welfare, depending on whether the tax change reducing volatility implies
higher or lower welfare. Analyzing the link between volatility and welfare should therefore
not be restricted to the usual mono-causal link from an exogenous source of volatility and
an endogenous welfare reaction but expanded to exogenous change in ﬁscal policy (or other
exogenous changes in the economic environment) and how natural volatility and welfare
react to this.
An important extension of the present analysis (and other papers in the literature on
endogenous ﬂuctuations and growth) would combine endogenous and exogenous sources of
ﬂuctuations. It appears reasonable to start an analysis of ﬂuctuations of any real word
economy by allowing for both endogenous jumps of and exogenous shocks to the technol-
ogy as well as nominal sources of ﬂuctuations. Labour market participation decisions and
unemployment should also be included in future work. The implications of our analysis for
the growth and volatility debate could also be worked out more precisely. With endogenous
volatility, taxes (or other policy parameters) aﬀect both long-run growth and volatility. As
in our welfare argument, the causal link from volatility on growth becomes a correlation.
The implied endogeneity of volatility in regression analyses could be tested.
7A p p e n d i x
This appendix contains derivations that are interesting from a theoretical perspective beyond
this speciﬁc paper. Section 7.1 derives the evolution of expected instantaneous utility. It uses
methods that were developed in the applied mathematical literature, e.g. Garcia and Griego
(1994). These methods are potentially useful also in other areas where Poisson processes are
25used (e.g. all search and matching models in monetary or labour economics). Section 7.2
computes an explicit expression for the variance of the growth rate. Again, various methods
are borrowed from Garcia and Griego (1994). Finally, section 7.3 computes the moments of
our basic random variable. This forms the basis for our measure of volatility. Interestingly,
we obtain a generalized β-distribution from this analysis.
Further derivations are included in the Referees’ appendix which is available upon request.
7.1 Evolution of expected instantaneous utility
This section computes the expected value of instantaneous utility, conditional on the current
state in t,g i v e nb yq(t) and K (t). The results provide information about expected growth
but are especially needed for computing the value function.
7.1.1 A lemma for E
¡
ckNτ¢
We ﬁrst compute some simple expectations that are used later.
Lemma 3 Assume that we are in t and form expectations about future arrivals of the Poisson




(ck−1)λ(τ−t),τ > t ,c , k = const.
Note that for integer k, these are the raw moments of cq(τ).
Proof. We can trivially rewrite ckq(τ) = ckq(t)ck[q(τ)−q(t)]. At time t, we know the realiza-
tion of q(t) and therefore Etckq(τ) = ckq(t)Etck[q(τ)−q(t)]. Computing this expectation requires


































summation of the probability function over the whole support of the Poisson distribution
which was used in the last step.
Lemma 4 Assume that we are in t and form expectations about future arrivals of the Poisson
process. Then the number of expected arrivals in the time interval [τ,s] equals the number




(ck−1)λ(τ−s),τ > s > t ,c , k = const.
Proof. This proof is in appendix C.1.1, it simply applies lemma 3.
267.1.2 Expected instantaneous utility
We will use in what follows the martingale property of various expressions. These expressions
are identical to or special cases of
R τ
t f (q(s),s)dq(s) − λ
R τ
t f (q(s),s)ds, of which Garcia










where λ is the (constant) arrival rate of q(s).












t b2u(s)dq (s). When we pull expectations into the integral (as in equation (30)), use











t b1m1 (s)ds −
R τ
t b2λm1 (s)ds and diﬀerentiating with respect
to time τ gives
˙ m1 (τ)=Θ
q(t)b0e
(Θ−1)λ[τ−t] − (b1 + λb2)m1 (τ). (49)





























where the last line used m1 (t)=Etu(t)=u(t) and (36) for β. Rearranging gives (37) in
the text.
7.2 The variance of the growth rate
This section derives an alternative expression for volatility, the variance of the growth rate.
This measure is more common in empirical work (e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995 or McConnell
and Perez-Quiros, 2000) than the variance of cyclical components, which in turn is used more
intensively in the RBC literature.
It is not immediately clear, however, how this variance should be computed. Is it the
variance of some long-run stationary distribution, limτ→∞vart [gτ,t], is it the variance of some
”annual” growth rate of some long-run distribution, limτ→∞vart [gτ+1,τ], or is it the variance
of the next ”period” in this model, vart [gt+1,t]? In a way, the choice of measure of variance is
arbitrary. We therefore choose the one that comes closest to the estimation of the variance
of observed growth rates. The counterpart to an observed annual growth rate for a ”year” t
in our model is gt+1,t. Taking many drawings, there is a set of annual growth rates {gt+1,t}
for which the variance can be estimated. Noting that annual growth rates are computed
given the knowledge on t, the analytical expression corresponding to this is the t-contingent
variance of gt+1,t, i.e. vart [gt+1,t].
Now, we can take advantage of the following straightforward relationship: The t-contingent
variance of the growth rate of some random variable is the same as the t-contingent variance










While this is trivial in a sense, it has the huge advantage that we can just compute the
second moment of u(τ) and thereby obtain the theoretical counterpart of the variance of
observed growth rates.
T h ev a r i a n c eo fu(τ) is computed by ﬁrst computing its second moment. To this end,













C o m p a r i n gi tt o( 3 3 )s h o w st h a tt h em a i nd i ﬀerence, apart from the square term u2 instead
of u, is the interaction Θqu between Θq and u. When forming expectations, we therefore have
to compute the expected interaction term, i.e. look at ψ(s) ≡ EtΘq(s)u(s). After "some
steps” (ﬁlling 6 pages in app. C.2), denoting
gψ ≡ (Θ2 − 1)λ>0,
βψ ≡ gψ + b1 +( 1− Θ[1 − b2])λ = b1 +( Θ2 − ΘΞ)λ>0,
β2 ≡ gψ +2 b1 +
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The structure of the variance is similar to previous structures in e.g. (37) for expected utility.
There are growth and convergence rates (51) and there are expected long-run quantities. As
a measure of volatility, however, the variance of the growth rate is less suitable for a variety
of reasons: First, when we let τ become very large, i.e. when we look at the ”long run”














This expression, however, represents the variance of the growth rate between t and T, i.e.
we would not compute the variance of annual growth rates but of T − t-year growth rates.
Clearly, such a variance can never be estimated in reality. Second, the expression for the
variance for annual growth rates, i.e. growth rates from t to t+1, is the complete expression in
(A.50) for τ = t+1. Understanding properties of this expression, like derivatives with respect
to certain tax rates appears analytically hopeless. Third, as a potential theoretical way out,
one could try and deterministically detrend u(τ) as discussed on page 14. Computing the
variance of the growth rate of deterministically detrended u(τ) (and not of u(τ) as done
here), however, does not yield a ﬁnite expression either as the variance grows at gψ while
inserting e−g[τ−t] in front of u(τ) in (50) would not compensate for gψ.
287.3 The cyclical component
7.3.1 The basic diﬀerential equation (42)




/(1 − σ) from (40), we have dˆ u =
(1/L)1−σ
1−σ d ˆ C1−σ. With ˆ C = Ψ ˆ K from
















































1−α (1 − σ) − b1 ˆ C
1−σ
´
dt − (1 − Ξ/Θ) ˆ C
1−σdq.








1−α (1 − σ) − b1 ˆ C
1−σ
´
dt − (1 − Ξ/Θ) ˆ C
1−σdq
i
=( b0 − b1ˆ u)dt − (1 − Ξ/Θ)ˆ udq.
7.3.2 Computing moments
The integral version of (42) for τ>tis ˆ u(τ)=ˆ u(t)+
R τ




Using the martingale result (48), the expected value of ˆ u(τ) is Etˆ u(τ)=ˆ u(t)+
R τ




ˆ b2Etˆ u(s)ds. This describes the evolution of the ﬁr s tm o m e n to fˆ u. Expressed as a dif-
ferential equation and using the deﬁnition in (43), we obtain ˙ ˆ m1 (τ)=b0−(b1+λˆ b2)ˆ m1 (τ).


















ˆ m1 (t) −
b0




b1 + λˆ b2
. (54)
As b1+λˆ b2 > 0, the ﬁrst moment of ˆ u is in the long run given by ˆ m1 (∞) ≡ limτ→∞ ˆ m1 (τ)=
b0
b1+λˆ b2,a sp r e s e n t e di n( 4 4 ) .
For higher moments, the basic diﬀerential equation determining the evolution of ˆ un is
from (42)
dˆ u
n = nˆ u
n−1 [b0 − b1ˆ u]dτ −
³




























dt. Using again (43),








29It can now be shown that all moments are constant for τ →∞ . This follows from (54)
for the ﬁrst moment and from appendix C.3.1 for the 2nd moment. This proof simply inserts
(54) into (55) and solves the diﬀerential equation. Proofs for higher moments would follow





1 − (1 −ˆ b2)n
i ˆ mn−1 (∞). (57)
By inserting n =2 , this directly implies (45), with n =1 , it becomes (44), remembering that
ˆ m0 =1by deﬁnition.
A well-known theorem states that a distribution with limited range is completely char-
acterized by its integer moments (e.g. Casella and Berger, 1990, th. 2.3.3.). As our
long-run moments are constant and the range of ˆ u is ﬁnite, the distribution of ˆ u exists,
is unique and stationery. Looking at the structure of moments in (57) further shows that
























¶n Γ(n +1 ) Γ(1 + λ/b1)
Γ(n +1+λ/b1)
,
where Γ(·) is the gamma-function. The last expression represents, apart from the scaling
factor (b0/b1)n,t h enth moment of a β-distribution with parameters 1 and λ/b1. (On the
β-distribution, see e.g. Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1995, ch. 25).) Since the β-
distribution is determined by its moments, we conclude that, for ˆ b2 =1 , ˆ u has the asymptotic





X, where X ∼ Beta(1,λ/b 1).W h e n ˆ b2 6=1 , we therefore obtain
a generalized β-distribution which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been encountered
before. Analyzing its properties in detail will have to be done in future research. We are
indebted to Christian Kleiber for pointing this out to us. For related aspects, see Kleiber
and Kotz (2003).
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